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Intra-Corporate Mail and Wire Fraud:
Criminal Liability for Fiduciary Breach
Mail/wire fraud law has evolved from its origins as an antidote to "lot-
tery swindles" into a vehicle for attacking a wide range of conduct. Re-
cently, a national standard of fiduciary liability, developed by federal
courts in mail/wire fraud cases, has been held to govern the obligations of
corporate directors and officers to their shareholders.' Public, criminal en-
forcement under mail/wire fraud thus overlaps the private, civil enforce-
ment of corporate fiduciary obligations. This Note contends that this use
of the criminal law to police corporate fiduciary obligations is injurious to
corporate shareholders-the supposed beneficiaries, contrary to principles
of federalism that apply with special force in the corporate law context,
and inconsistent with the principle that criminal proscriptions should be
certain and knowable in advance.
This recent use of mail/wire fraud law to enforce fiduciary duties has
little to do with fraud. The new corporate fiduciary standard is untenable
on theoretical grounds, as is the use of criminal sanctions to enforce essen-
tially contractual duties. Furthermore, this development in mail/wire
fraud clashes with the congressional and judicial policy of minimizing fed-
eral involvement in intra-corporate affairs. The Note concludes that, con-
trary to accepted notions of legality, courts have used mail/wire fraud law
to create a virtual common law crime.
1. See United States v. Weiss, No. 84-1103, slip op. (2d Cir. Jan. 7, 1985); United States v.
Siegel, 717 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1983). Weiss and Siegel are mail/wire fraud cases premised upon an
undisclosed breach of fiduciary duty by a corporate executive. Neither case suggests that any pecuni-
ary injury befell shareholders. Rather, the cases assert that shareholders were deprived of the honest
and faithful services of the defendant corporate officials and were thus "defrauded." Both cases in-
volve the creation of a cash fund for a corporate employer-in Weiss by means of cash refunds on
stock purchases and in Siegel by means of off-book sales of merchandise-which the defendants did
not disclose to shareholders.
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I. MAIL/WIRE FRAUD HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT: FROM
LOTTERY SWINDLES TO "CORPORATE IMPROPRIETIES"
This section traces the development of mail/wire fraud law from its
legislative origins to its current state.
A. Legislative Origins and Early Development
The federal mail fraud statute,2 enacted in 1870 to combat frauds per-
petrated by lottery swindlers through the mails,' long ago outgrew its ori-
gins. Serving as a jurisdictional hook to facilitate federal prosecutorial in-
volvement where it is not otherwise explicitly authorized, the mail fraud
statute is now regularly used to prosecute general wrongdoing on the basis
that a letter was posted during the course of the scheme." Chief Justice
Burger has described the statute as a "first line of defense"' against here-
tofore unseen criminal conduct against which prosecutors lack statutory
weapons-indicating the expansive use to which the statute has been put.'
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982) provides, in pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for ob-
taining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises . . . places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or
thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service . . . shall be fined not more than
$1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
3. The bill's sponsor stated that the provision was necessary "to prevent the frauds which are
mostly gotten up in the large cities. . . by thieves, forgers, and rapscallions generally, for the purpose
of deceiving and fleecing the innocent people in the country." CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 35
(1870) (remarks of Rep. Farnsworth).
4. For a discussion of the development of mail fraud, see Coffee, The Metastasis of Mail Fraud:
The Continuing Story of the "Evolution" of a White-Collar Crime, 21 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 1 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Coffee, The Metastasis of Mail Fraud]; Coffee, From Tort to Crime: Some Re-
flections on the Criminalization of Fiduciary Breaches and the Problematic Line Between Law and
Ethics, 19 Am. CrIM. L. REv. 117 (1981); Hurson, Limiting the Federal Mail Fraud Statute-A
Legislative Approach, 20 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 423, 426-35 (1983).
5. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice
explained: "When a 'new' fraud develops-as constantly happens-the mail fraud statute becomes a
stopgap device to deal on a temporary basis with the new phenomenon, until particularized legislation
can be developed and passed to deal directly with the evil." Id. at 405-06.
Mail/wire fraud is used, however, as more than a stopgap device. These statutes have been used to
prosecute conduct with which either state law or federal securities law has dealt for years. In fact,
mail/wire fraud cases often involve securities law charges as well. See, e.g., United States v. Newman,
664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981) (involving mail fraud, and criminal violations of § 10(b) of Securities
Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5); United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388 (2d Cir. 1976) (involv-
ing mail fraud and numerous criminal violations of federal securities laws). Once mail/wire fraud has
been stretched to cover heretofore unregulated conduct, even if legislation is passed to deal with the
specific "evil," there is no guarantee that prosecutors will employ the new statutes rather than mail/
wire fraud. Expansive judicial interpretations of criminal statutes, made in the name of giving the
legislature a chance to enact specific legislation, serve in fact to encourage prosecutors to stick with the
old, general enabling statutes and allow them to prosecute conduct against which the legislature may
never choose to pass a federal law. Furthermore, the existence of such open-ended statutes may lessen
the incentive for the legislature to respond to a weakness in the law with appropriate legislation.
6. Jed Rakoff, a former federal prosecutor, in a blush of enthusiasm for the mail fraud statute's
versatility, described the statute as follows:
To federal prosecutors of white collar crime, the mail fraud statute is our Stradivarius, our
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The elements of mail and wire fraud,' as these statutes have recently been
construed,' consist of the formation of a scheme to defraud' and use of the
mails/wires to further the scheme.10
Under the "intangible-rights" doctrine, proof of fraud does not turn on
whether a fiduciary acquired a victim's property under false pretenses; he
is criminally liable if he deprived his beneficiaries of their right to honest
and faithful services." Recent mail/wire fraud cases have extended this
doctrine.' 2 To establish fraud, the prosecution need not prove that the
Colt 45, our Louisville Slugger, our Cuisinart-and our true love. We may flirt with RICO,
show off with 10b-5, and call the conspiracy law "darling," but we always come home to the
virtues of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, with its simplicity, adaptability, and comfortable familiarity. It
understands us and, like many a foolish spouse, we like to think we understand it.
Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (pt. 1), 18 DuQ. L. REv. 771, 771 (1980) (citations
omitted).
7. The federal wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982), provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for ob-
taining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communi-
cation in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the
purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or impris-
oned not more than five years, or both.
8. The mail and wire fraud statutes have been identically construed with respect to the issues
discussed herein. See Weiss, No. 84-1103, slip op. (2d Cir. Jan. 7, 1985) (relying on Siegel, a wire
fraud case, to affirm mail fraud convictions); Siegel, 717 F.2d at 14; United States v. Barta, 635 F.2d
999, 1005 n.11 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998 (1981); United States v. Louderman, 576
F.2d 1383, 1387 n.3 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896 (1978).
9. The question of what constitutes a scheme to defraud has long been elusive. Courts have at
times relied on analogies to breaches of duty in other areas of law in order to define the term "fraud."
For a discussion of the judicial treatment of the fraud requirement of the federal conspiracy statute,
see Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405 (1959).
10. Use of the mails or of electronic means of communication serves as the basis of federal juris-
diction. The communications need not be fraudulent, but must simply be made in the course of the
scheme. See United States v. Abrams, 539 F.Supp. 378, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("To prove a violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, the government must prove that the defendant was a knowing participant in a
fraudulent scheme that was furthered by the use of interstate transmission facilities.") (citation
omitted).
11. The intangible-rights doctrine has been used to prosecute political figures for corruption. See,
e.g., United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983);
United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), affd in relevant part on reh'g en banc, 602 F.2d
653 (4th Cir. 1979) (per curiam), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980); United States v. Brown, 540
F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 976 (1976); United States v. Issacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974);
United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974). This use of
the doctrine has been criticized. See Comment, The Intangible-Rights Doctrine and Political-
Corruption Prosecutions Under the Federal Mail Fraud Statute, 47 U. CHs. L. REv. 562, 564
(1980) (mail fraud statute "should not be read to extend to political-corruption cases").
12. Recently, the intangible-rights doctrine has been used to prosecute private fiduciaries. See
Weiss, No. 84-1103, slip op. at 7103 (2d Cir. Jan. 7, 1985); Siegel, 717 F.2d at 13. See also United
States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981) (reinstating indictment on mail fraud charges of
securities trader who participated in scheme to trade on information regarding corporate takeovers
obtained from employees of investment banking firms); United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920 (2d
Cir. 1981) (affirming conviction of defendant, a partner in a law firm and a state senator, for mail
fraud involving breach of fiduciary duty as an attorney and breach of duty of loyalty to the firm and
one of its clients by promoting the interests of client's competitor), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982);
United States v. Barta, 635 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1980) (reinstating indictment of bond trader/salesman
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fraud's victims were directly harmed."3 Rather, the now-standard test14
requires both a breach of duty by a fiduciary and nondisclosure 5 of mate-
rial information.' However, nondisclosure of the breach itself'7 consti-
in especially powerful and trusted position for wire fraud and conspiracy based on allegations that he
withheld information about thin capitalization of trading firm in which he had an interest). But see
United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388 (2d Cir. 1976) (refusing to extend intangible-rights doctrine to
private fiduciaries). Dixon has proven to be an abberation in the Second Circuit which has allowed
use of the doctrine to prosecute private fiduciaries since Barta.
13. There is some doubt as to whether the prosecution is required to prove that harm was even
contemplated. "The district court erred in holding that, in every mail fraud case based upon a breach
of fiduciary duty by a private employee, there must be proof of 'direct, tangible, economic loss to the
victim, actual or contemplated."' Newman, 664 F.2d at 20 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). But
see Siegel, 717 F.2d at 14 ("the prosecution must show that some harm or injury was contemplated by
the scheme, United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1399 n.11 (2d Cir. 1976)"). It is not clear that
the Siegel court properly applied the existing law of the Second Circuit, since Barta seemed to over-
rule Dixon. However, Weiss, the most recent case, followed Siegel. "While the government must show
that some harm or injury was contemplated by the scheme, it need not show that 'direct, tangible
economic loss resulted to the scheme's intended victims."' Weiss, No. 84-1103, slip op. at 7102-03 (2d
Cir. Jan. 7, 1985) (citations omitted).
14. Formulated by the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641, 648 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976), this test has been widely followed in the circuits. See cases
cited supra notes 11 & 12.
15. "The additional element which frequently transformt a mere fiduciary breach into a criminal
offense is a violation of the employee's duty to disclose material information to his employer." Barta,
635 F.2d at 1006.
16. Despite the refinement of the materiality standard in the context of the federal securities laws,
mail/wire fraud cases do not refer to that standard. See TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426
U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (characterizing materiality for purposes of SEC Rule 14a-9, which prohibits
false or misleading statements in proxy solicitations, as "[whether] there is a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable shareholder would consider [an omitted fact] important in deciding how to
vote. . . . Put another way, there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted
fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix'
of information made available."). The mail/wire fraud standard of materiality, in contrast, has been
drawn from whole cloth by judges on an ad hoc basis. See Siegel, 717 F.2d at 15 (quoting jury
instruction which read, "a material fact is one which would be important to a reasonable person in
deciding whether to engage in a particular transaction or to engage in certain conduct."). Defendants
in Siegel alleged that the amount involved in their "scheme" ($100,000 over a nine-year period or
slightly more than $11,000 per year) was so small as to be immaterial in light of the corporation's
sales volume, which ranged between $30 million and $109 million in the nine-year period. The ma-
jority dismissed this defense, claiming that it "borders on the frivolous." Siegel, 717 F.2d at 14. The
dissent, however, is more consistent with TSC, characterizing the amount involved as "a wholly trivial
sum in light of Mego's sales. In holding that these transactions 'would be important to a Mego
stockholder,' the majority simply closes its eyes to investment realities, for there is not a shred of
evidence that such a sum would affect share price in the slightest." Siegel, 717 F.2d at 24 (Winter, J.,
dissenting).
On the application of the TSC standard in cases involving illegal corporate activity, see Roiter,
Illegal Corporate Practices and the Disclosure Requirements of the Federal Securities Laws, 50
FORDHAM L. REv. 781, 790 (1982) ("[T]he standard of financial materiality, based on the premise
that monetary gain is the paramount, if not sole, concern of stockholders, must generally be met."
(footnote omitted)).
17. The element of nondisclosure does little to narrow this standard of liability, since fiduciaries
are unlikely to disclose their breaches of duty. See Coffee, The Metastasis of Mail Fraud, supra note
4, at 1-2 ("As a practical matter, the operative effect of this disclosure requirement is to simplify the
prosecutor's case by substituting proof of nondisclosure for proof of loss or illicit gain.").
The majority in Siegel noted that under prior Second Circuit decisions,
"a mere breach of fiduciary duty, standing alone, may not necessarily constitute a mail fraud,"
However, we have held that the statute is violated when a fiduciary fails to disclose material
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tutes nondisclosure for the purposes of establishing "fraud." The conduct
prohibited by these statutes is, therefore, nothing more than an undis-
closed breach of duty by anyone labeled a fiduciary."8
B. Elimination of the "Scheme to Defraud" Element: The Crime of
"Corporate Improprieties"
The law of fiduciary obligations, an age-old and highly articulated
component of corporate law,1" has been loosely transposed into federal
criminal law in mail/wire fraud cases. By defining the formation of a
"scheme to defraud" by reference to a breach of fiduciary duty, and
broadening the definition of such a breach to include non-injurious con-
duct,20 recent cases seem to eliminate the last vestiges of the element of
fraud from mail/wire fraud.
It is thus no longer clear that the prosecution must prove the existence
of a scheme to defraud as one element of mail/wire fraud. United States
v. Siegel21 and United States v. Weiss"2 both involved wide-ranging alle-
gations of criminal wrongdoing, but in both cases, the mail/wire fraud
convictions were premised on defendants' creation of an unaccounted-for
information "which he is under a duty to disclose to another under circumstances where the
non-disclosure could or does result in harm to the other."
Siegel, 717 F.2d at 14 (citations omitted). The court concluded that the jury could have found that the
defendants acted "in breach of their fiduciary duties to act in the best interest of the corporation and
to disclose material information." Id. (emphasis added). Disclosure itself is thereby a fiduciary duty;
in failing to make adequate disclosure, the defendants breached their fiduciary duties. Therefore, no
more than a "mere breach of fiduciary duty" is required to establish mail/wire fraud if the duty
breached is the duty to disclose material information.
18. Fiduciary relationships are quite common. One commentator has noted that "our society is
evolving into one based predominantly on fiduciary relations." Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L.
REV. 795, 798 (1983). Fiduciary relationships are the subject of
a considerable body of law based on implied or express contract governing whether particular
behavior is legal. Its most notable feature, however, is the degree to which fiduciary obligations
vary from relationship to relationship. Partners, employees, trustees and corporate directors are
all fiduciaries, yet their legal obligations may be wholly dissimilar. While an hourly employee
usually may quit a job without fearing legal action even though he leaves at a time which
makes it difficult for the employer to continue business, a trustee may not so easily abandon
his beneficiaries. While a trustees actions are void or voidable if tainted by a conflict of inter-
est, the corporate officer generally can act even if he is personally interested so long as the
action is fair to the corporation.
United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 142 (2d Cir. 1982) (Winter, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 913 (1983). Yet, the reviewing courts in mail/wire fraud cases have not discussed the variety
of fiduciary relationships, nor have they spoken of the various fiduciary duties. Instead, they have
referred to "fiduciary duty" as if it were a unitary concept.
19. See W. CARY & M. EisFNBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 518-712 (5th
ed. 1980).
20. See Weiss, No. 84-1103, slip op. at 7120 (2d Cir. Jan. 7, 1985) (Newman, J., dissenting)
("[C]reation of the cash fund, for which Weiss was convicted, was indisputably for the benefit of the
corporation."). Similarly, in Siegel, the conduct for which the defendants were convicted benefited the
corporation by providing it with cash.
21. 717 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1983).
22. No. 84-1103. slip op. (2d Cir. Jan. 7, 1985).
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pool of cash for their corporate employer.2 In neither case was there any
direct evidence that the defendants used the cash for personal benefit. In
Siegel, the majority used a judicial sleight-of-hand in order to allow the
inference that the defendants used the money for self-enrichment. Specifi-
cally, it noted as probative of personal use the fact that "there was testi-
mony which showed that [the defendants] personally received the proceeds
from the cash sales and either pocketed them or placed them in the corpo-
rate safe deposit box." 4 As the dissent in Siegel noted, however,
By allowing an inference of diversion to personal use to be drawn
solely from the lack of proper records, the majority has in effect
dropped the element of a scheme to defraud from the offense ...
In effect, a new crime-corporate improprieties-which entails
neither fraud nor even a victim, has been created.25
Weiss confirms the accuracy of this view of Siegel:
Our case is within the ambit of the holding in Siegel. There is no
requirement that the government prove that the misappropriated
funds were used by Weiss for his own enrichment. Rather, evidence
of a non-corporate purpose, explicitly or implicitly derived, will sat-
isfy the requirements of Siegel.28
Hence, it is sufficient for the government to prove only that corporate
executives generated a pool of cash for the corporation 27 -an act which
does not injure shareholders 8 -in order to establish a breach of fiduciary
23. Cash transactions are often the hallmark of tax evasion, and defendants in Siegel were in fact
convicted of "aiding in the preparation of a false corporate income tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C.
§ 7206(2)." Siegel, 717 F.2d at 10. Neither defendant appealed. The defendant in Weiss, however,
"was acquitted of. . .four counts of tax fraud, 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2)." Weiss, No. 84-1103, slip op. at
7095 (2d Cir. Jan. 7, 1985).
24. Siegel, 717 F.2d at 15.
25. Siegel, 717 F.2d at 24 (Winter, J., dissenting).
26. Weiss, No. 84-1103, slip op. at 7104 (2d Cir. Jan. 7, 1985) (emphasis added). In fact, the
prosecution in Weiss had alleged in the indictment that the defendant, and not the corporation, had
kept the cash. At trial, however, the prosecution dropped this allegation and instead contended that
Weiss defrauded shareholders by creating a cash fund for the corporation. This change drew a
sharply worded dissent from Judge Newman on the grounds that it amounted to "an egregious exam-
ple of a constructive amendment of an indictment, in violation of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 7120
(Newman, J., dissenting).
27. There are suggestions in Siegel that the defendants used the cash to bribe labor officials and
customers, and in Weiss that the defendant falsified documents, but in neither case was the govern-
ment required to prove these allegations in order to make out a case of mail/wire fraud. Rather, the
prosecution presented these allegations to the juries in order to support the claim that the defendants
acted with a "non-corporate purpose" in mind. Had the prosecution in fact been able to prove these
allegations, presumably they would have done so, and, to the extent that the conduct involved was in
fact criminal (which is not immediately obvious, at least in the case of commercial bribes or refunds),
the prosecution would not have had to rely on mail/wire fraud.
28. It is more plausible to argue that shareholders or creditors of another corporation were in-
jured by the conduct in Weiss. Weiss obtained stock in Westchester Premier Theatre ("WPT") for his
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duty sufficient to win mail/wire fraud convictions. Under this standard,
an irregularity in bookkeeping, 9 or any other such "corporate impropri-
ety," would allow the inference of a non-corporate purpose and hence
criminal liability for the corporation's executives despite their complete
lack of fraudulent intent or effect. Thus, Weiss and Siegel stretch the defi-
nition of fiduciary duty so far as effectively to cut the tie between the
mail/wire fraud statutes and fraud.
II. FIDUCIARY LAW IN THE MODERN CORPORATION
In contrast to the mail/wire fraud cases' ungrounded use of fiduciary
liability, corporate law scholarship lays out a conceptual framework of
fiduciary law based on its economic function in the modern corporation. 0
While the mail/wire fraud cases simply invoke the term "fiduciary" with-
out delineating the basis of such a duty or the type of duty owed by the
fiduciary, corporate law cases have focused on defining who is a fiduci-
ary31 and what duties such status should entail.32
employer, Warner Communications, Inc., at what amounted to half-price. Weiss, using Warner
funds, paid face value for the WPT stock and Warner received half of the purchase price back in
cash. On the face of it, this transaction would seem to defraud those who invested in or lent to WPT
believing that Warner had paid full price for its WPT stock. To the extent that WPT listed the
Warner stock purchases at face value rather than at the net amount, it misrepresented its capitaliza-
tion to investors and lenders in a way that could have injured them. This is quite speculative, how-
ever, since the case makes no reference to any such scenario. Note, however, that if these investors and
lenders were in fact defrauded, they were defrauded by WPT with Weiss having only an accessorial
role. Furthermore, the prosecution's theory in Weiss would be unavailing since Weiss owed no fiduci-
ary duty to WPT's lenders and investors.
29. This is especially troublesome since accounting standards are constantly in flux:
Accounting, like other social science disciplines and human activities, is largely a product of its
environment. The environment of accounting consists of social-economic-political-legal condi-
tions, restraints, and influences that vary from time to time. As a result, accounting objectives
and practices are not the same today as they were in the past, because accounting theory has
evolved to meet changing demands and influences.
D. KiEso & J. WEYGANDT, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 4 (4th ed. 1983) (emphasis in original).
30. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 700-03
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Easterbrook & Fischel]; Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and
the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 273-76 (1977); Wolfson, A Critique of Corpo-
rate Law, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 959, 975 (1980).
31. A classic presentation of the question of who owes the corporation's shareholders a fiduciary
duty is Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173, 175-76 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955),
which involved the question of whether a controlling shareholder (who was also chairman of the
board of directors and president of the corporation) could sell his controlling interest in the corpora-
tion to a third party at a premium above the market value of the shares. For a discussion of this case,
see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 30, at 716-18.
32. In his formulation of this problem, Justice Frankfurter wrote:
[T]o say that a man is a fiduciary only begins an analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry.
To whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary? In what respect has
he failed to discharge these obligations? And what are the consequences of his deviation from
duty?
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943).
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A. Fiduciary Law and Agency Theory
Corporate law scholarship on fiduciary obligations is built on the cor-
nerstone recognition that fiduciary rules in the corporate domain govern
agency relations, and that these rules, as such, are contractual in nature.33
In the context of the modern corporation, directors and officers serve as
agents who advance the interests of their principals-the corporation's
shareholders. The potential divergence of interest between agent and prin-
cipal creates agency costs.34 Early corporate law scholarship emphasized
the injury shareholders might suffer as control of large corporations was
separated from ownership. 5 Recent scholarship, however, points out that
this separation facilitates large accumulations of capital and productive
capacity and enables firms to exploit economies of scale, thereby benefit-
ing shareholders and their agents.3" This separation is not costless to
shareholders, who incur agency costs as a result of their having corporate
executives run the firm. These costs include the costs of transacting with
agents37 and costs which arise from agents' opportunism or laziness.38 The
benefits associated with the separation may-and to the extent that large
public corporations compete successfully with proprietorships, do--
outweigh the costs.
The law of fiduciary duty aims at minimizing the costs that result from
agency relationships while maximizing the gains for which principals
enter into agency contracts. Judicially enforced fiduciary rules should re-
flect the contractual obligations the parties would have arranged had they
been able:
33. Easterbrook & Fischel characterize agency relationships as follows:
An agency relationship is an agreement in which one or more persons (the principal) delegates
authority to another person (the agent) to perform some service on the principal's behalf. The
entire corporate structure is a web of agency relationships ....
Delegation-including the "separation of ownership and control"-exists because both prin-
cipal and agent share in the benefits of agency relationships. Nonetheless, the interests of
agents may diverge from the interests of principals after the delegation has occurred.
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 30, at 700-01.
34. See Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Own-
ership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm,
88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980); Smith & Warner, On Financial Contracting An Analysis of Bond
Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117 (1979).
35. See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 116
(rev. ed. 1968) ("[W]here the bulk of the profits of enterprise are scheduled to go to owners who are
individuals other than those in control, the interests of the latter are as likely as not to be at variance
with those of ownership and . . . the controlling group is in a position to serve its own interests.").
36. See supra note 30.
37. "The new institutional economics is preoccupied with the origins, incidence, and ramifications
of transaction costs." Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Re-
lations, 22 J.L. & EcON. 233, 233 (1979).
38. "[M]anagers will manage with an eye to increasing their own expected utility by maximizing
future compensation including salary, job tenure, promotion prospects, informal perquisites, and op-
portunities for consuming leisure and other goods on the job." Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strate-
gies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 863 (1984).
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Acting as a standard-form penalty clause in every agency contract,
the elastic contours of the fiduciary principle reflect the difficulty
that contracting parties have in anticipating when and how their in-
terests may diverge.
Socially optimal fiduciary rules approximate the bargain that in-
vestors and agents would strike if they were able to dicker at no cost.
Such rules preserve the gains resulting from the delegation of au-
thority and the division of labor while limiting the ability of agents
to further their own interests at the expense of investors. The exis-
tence of such "off-the-rack" rules reduces the costs of transacting and
of enforcing restrictions on the agent's powers. 39
Imposing fiduciary duties by means of legal rules, however, deters
harmful conduct by agents only at a cost to shareholder-principals.40 Non-
legal constraints, such as market constraints, may be both more effective
and less expensive to shareholders than legal rules.41 Legal rules affecting
corporations should, therefore, reflect the existence of these nonlegal con-
straints on managerial conduct, and should operate principally in those
zones in which markets systematically underdeter harmful conduct (or do
not deter it at all).42 Corporate fiduciary law should reflect not simply the
danger of misconduct by corporate executives, but also an evaluation of
39. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 30, at 702. Wolfson articulated a similar view:
The purpose of the fiduciary principle is to compel directors and controlling shareholders to
manage the enterprise fairly on behalf of all the owners rather than in the interest of the
managers or only some of the shareholders. It is essentially a regulatory attempt to minimize
the agency costs of separation of ownership and control.
Wolfson, supra note 30, at 975.
40. Responding to an article on the "laxity" of Delaware corporate law, Professor Winter noted:
To say a legal system is marked by "laxity" implies a cost-benefit judgment about more strin-
gent regulation but such rhetoric in the shareholder protection area is rarely accompanied by
the analysis such judgments call for. In truth, a "lax" legal system is neither intuitively nor
empirically inferior to a stringent one.
Winter, supra note 30, at 258 (responding to Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections
Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974)). A broad body of legal scholarship has since examined
various problems of corporate regulation with an eye to the cost-effectiveness of legal rules. See Eco-
NOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECUIRrIMEs REGULATION (R. Posner & K. Scott eds. 1980)
(excerpting principal works); Carlton & Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 857 (1983); Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70
VA. L. REv. 669 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure]; Gilson
& Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549 (1984); Kraakman, supra
note 38.
41. Markets which constrain managers include the product and service markets, the capital mar-
kets, the market for managerial services, and the so-called "market for management control." See
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 30, at 701; Winter, supra note 30, at 262-66. The pioneering
article on the market for management control as a constraint on managerial behavior is Manne, Merg-
ers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965).
42. "[Market] mechanisms may be inadequate to deal with one-time defalcations, when the agent
concludes that the opportunities of the moment exceed any subsequent penalties in the employment
market." Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 30, at 701.
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the costs of such misconduct compared to the costs associated with the
laws that prohibit it.4
B. The Traditional Duties of Corporate Fiduciaries
Traditionally, corporate law has recognized two primary fiduciary
duties-a duty of care in managing the affairs of the corporation and a
duty of loyalty to the corporation 44-and has defined these duties in a way
that is consistent with their economic function.
1. The Duty of Care and the Business Judgment Rule
The business judgment rule protects corporate managers from liability
by shielding bona-fide business judgments from judicial second-guessing,45
and is thus consistent with the contractual view of corporate fiduciary du-
ties and with the notion that legal constraints on agents impose costs on
principals. Managers, by virtue of their large investment of human capital
in one firm, are undiversified46 and therefore more risk-averse than share-
holders, who can diversify their holdings and thereby reduce their expo-
sure to risk.47 Even without the risk of liability for business failure, corpo-
rate managers may prove overly risk-averse from the perspective of
diversified shareholders. The purpose of the business judgment rule is to
avoid exacerbating this already excessive managerial risk-aversion by
43. This type of analysis parallels that done in G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS
(1970), which examines both accident costs and avoidance costs under different liability systems.
44. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 19, at 518-712.
45. The business judgment rule reflects the fact that risk-taking benefits shareholders generally,
though it will at times produce losses and hence lawsuits. The purpose of the rule is to prevent courts
from second-guessing business decisions rendered by businesspersons under high-pressure, competitive
conditions. Under the business judgment rule, ordinary negligence in the conduct of the business is
insufficient to establish liability. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) ("[Ulnder the
business judgment rule director liability is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence." (footnote
omitted) (emphasis added)); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) ("A board of
directors enjoys a presumption of sound business judgment, and its decisions will not be disturbed if
they can be attributed to any rational business purpose. A court under such circumstances will not
substitute its own notions of what is or is not sound business judgment."); Kamin v. American Ex-
press Co., 86 Misc.2d 809, 813, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 811 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) ("It is not enough to allege,
as plaintiffs do here, that the directors made an imprudent decision . . . . More than imprudence or
mistaken judgment must be shown."), af'd mem., 54 A.D.2d 654, 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (N.Y. App. Div.
1976). But see Smith v. Van Gorkom, No. 255, at 3 (Del. Jan. 29, 1985) (declining to apply the
business judgment rule where board's decision "was not the product of an informed business judg-
ment." (emphasis added)). While there is disagreement over exactly when and how the rule should be
applied, there is general agreement over the need for and purpose of the rule.
46. "Unlike shareholders, managers are undiversified risk bearers who invest their services in only
one firm at a time. Thus, they will tend to evaluate firm projects with a risk-averse bias unless they
are paid to do otherwise." Kraakman, supra note 38, at 864.
47. For an explanation of the value of diversification as a method of lessening risk, see R.
BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 120 (1981) ("[Dliversification can
almost halve the variability of returns . . . . Diversification works because prices of different stocks
do not move exactly together."); W. KLEIN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 147-58 (1980).
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preventing the imposition of liability on managers who take worthy busi-
ness risks and lose. Thus, the rule mitigates the inherent conflict of inter-
est between managers and shareholders over the risk level of the firm.48
This rule is appropriate since substantial risk-taking is what shareholders
contract for in purchasing common stock.
2. The Duty of Loyalty
Duty of loyalty cases arise out of transactions in which a corporate ex-
ecutive may have interests not fully concurrent with those of shareholders.
In potential conflict of interest situations, the business judgment rule does
not apply.49 Virtually all management decisions, however, can be con-
strued as self-interested, 50 or at least as having an impact on manage-
48. Management's inherent risk-aversion creates agency costs. Managers may avoid volatile but
potentially profitable projects, or seek to diversify at the firm level to reduce the firm's overall risk
level. See Amihud & Lev, Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers, 12
BEL J. ECON. 605, 605 (1981) ("[Mlanagers, as opposed to investors, are hypothesized to engage in
conglomerate mergers to decrease their largely undiversifiable 'employment risk' . . . ."); Note, The
Conflict Between Managers and Shareholders in Diversifying Acquisitions: A Portfolio Theory Ap-
proach, 88 YALE L.J. 1238, 1241-44 (1979) (contending that managers seek to diversify their firm-
specific investment in their corporate employer by diversifying through either internal expansion into
new product lines or acquisition of companies in businesses unrelated to that of employer). Diversifi-
cation at the firm level can prove quite costly to shareholders. See Mason & Goudzwaard, Perform-
ance of Conglomerate Firms: A Portfolio Approach, 31 J. FIN. 39 (1976) (concluding that randomly
selected diversified portfolio of securities, i.e., diversification at shareholder level, out-performed con-
glomerate firms). Thus, firm-level diversification may occur when managers choose to increase the
stability of their employment at the expense of shareholder welfare.
Firm-level diversification may, in some instances, benefit shareholders. See Williamson, The Mod-
em Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes, 19 J. ECoN. Lrr. 1537 (1981) (noting that manag-
ers properly make diversifying acquisitions to replace capital rationing mechanism of public finance
markets with internal mechanism which may be preferable due to greater level of information availa-
ble to decision makers).
49. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (in order for business judgment rule to
apply, "directors can neither appear on both sides of a transaction nor expect to derive any personal
financial benefit from it in the sense of self-dealing, as opposed to a benefit which devolves upon the
corporation or all stockholders generally." (citations omitted)). Rather, when the directors have a
personal interest in a transaction, they are required to establish that the transaction is fair to the
corporation. Thus, both the burden of proof and the standard of review are different in cases involving
self-interested dealings. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) ("When the
situation involves a parent and a subsidiary, with the parent controlling the transaction and fixing the
terms, the test of intrinsic fairness, with its resulting shifting of the burden of proof, is applied."
(citations omitted)).
50. One crucial business decision, how to compensate managers, is unavoidably laced with poten-
tial conflicts of interest. Management itself (or a committee of outside directors which it chooses) must
decide how to allocate the firm's income among reinvestment, dividends, and personal salaries or
bonuses. To conclude that every dollar management keeps is taken from the pockets of shareholders is
to miss the "supply-side" point that managers are more likely to produce corporate income for share-
holders if they stand to benefit themselves from doing so. See P. ROBERTS, THE SUPPLY-SIDE
REVOLUTION (1984). Thus, managers can stay within the bounds of an appropriate duty of loyalty
while extracting very large salaries and bonuses, as long as they also benefit shareholders. Defining
the duty of loyalty in executive compensation cases becomes a problem of arbitrary line-drawing.
Wolfson explains: "While the director's duty of loyalty is intended to place some restraint upon man-
agement indulging its self-interest at the expense of shareholders, the doctrine is notoriously difficult
to apply in the area of compensation, since corporate law cannot simulate a 'just' compensation pack-
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ment's welfare."" It is therefore difficult to identify particular acts as vio-
lating the duty of loyalty for which shareholders would bargain. Legal
enforcement of this duty should be undertaken only with trepidation, for it
risks imposing too onerous a standard (one beyond that which sharehold-
ers would choose to impose) on management and thus deterring beneficial
transactions.
The strength and efficiency of market constraints on managerial mis-
conduct, coupled with the potentially deleterious effect on shareholders
that could result from courts' policing of loyalty (even in civil actions),
have led at least one commentator to recommend that courts cease trying
to police corporate fiduciaries' duty of loyalty, leaving such policing exclu-
sively to the various markets.52 If judicial searching for the precise legal
requirement of loyalty for which shareholders would bargain is worth un-
dertaking, it should be done with caution. One appropriate use of the duty
of loyalty is to protect shareholders from one-time raids on the corporate
assets by their manager-agents. This sort of misconduct is not policed by
markets since these actors typically exit the marketplace and thus are not
subject to its discipline. 53 However, it is easier to cite the ideal situation in
which law can function effectively than to characterize events that have
already occurred as falling on one side or the other of the fiduciary line.
Such decision-making is fraught with the risk of error.
C. Corporate Fiduciary Liability Under Mail/Wire Fraud
The mall/wire fraud standard of corporate fiduciary liability does not
reflect recent advancement in corporate law theory and practice. The stan-
dard is not well suited to enforce either the duty of care or the duty of
loyalty.
A general criminal statute, enforced by juries in criminal prosecutions,
is too blunt an instrument with which to engage in the precise line-
drawing necessary to enforce an appropriate standard of fiduciary loyalty.
Judicial policing of loyalty, if worthwhile at all, ought not be done in
age. Only the market can do that." Wolfson, supra note 30, at 975 (footnote omitted).
Nevertheless, it is quite plausible that under current mail/wire fraud doctrine, the criminal law
may be used to police the duty of loyalty in just this way. "It requires little imagination to foresee
future application of the theory of this case to the use of corporate airplanes, the size of executive
salaries, expense accounts, etc." Siegel, 717 F.2d at 24 (Winter, J., dissenting).
51. In deciding to make an acquisition, for example, management may intend to increase returns
to shareholders or to diversify its own position. See Note, supra note 48, at 1244 ("investment deci-
sions afford managers the opportunity for reducing the firm-specific risk to which they are
subjected").
52. See Wolfson, supra note 30, at 994 ("It is likely that much of corporate law produces more
harm than good and frequently interferes with the benefits that would flow from the competitive
forces of the marketplace.").
53. See supra note 42.
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criminal cases, where the consequences of the inevitable failures of judg-
ment are severe.
In Siegel, wire fraud convictions were based on defendants' involvement
in "a scheme to defraud [the corporation and its] stockholders by violating
their fiduciary duties to act honestly and faithfully in the best interest of
the corporation . . . . -15 Though this holding seems to have been directed
at a breach of loyalty, by its own terms the holding can apply to general
breaches of fiduciary duties, including a breach of the duty of care. Ap-
propriate enforcement of the duty of care involves application of the busi-
ness judgment rule, yet federal courts have applied no such rule to limit
liability in mail/wire fraud cases. 55 Under current mail/wire fraud law,
then, ordinary business failure may yield criminal liability.
The heightened possibility of liability, indeed of criminal liability, for
business failure or suspect loyalty is likely to magnify the already exces-
sive risk-aversion of corporate managers 5 6-- or cause them to demand in-
creased compensation to offset this risk of criminal liability-and thereby
reduce returns to shareholders. To the detriment of the alleged victims of
fraud-the shareholders-mail/wire fraud law circumvents a state law
system of private, civil enforcement of fiduciary duties that is consistent
with the economic function of corporate law.57
54. Siegel, 717 F.2d at 13.
55. The court in Siegel could reasonably have inferred a business judgment rule from the "honest
and faithful" language, but it did not; nor did the Weiss court in applying the holding in Siegel.
Interestingly, the Siegel court acknowledged the weak foundation of the prosecution's case:
In affirming defendants' convictions on the wire fraud counts, we in no way wish to encourage
the type of indictment prosecuted here. Twenty counts were brought against five defendants,
all but two of whom were acquitted of all charges. Siegel and Abrams, although convicted of
the wire fraud charges (which might more properly have been redressed in a shareholder's
derivative suit or in a state criminal prosecution), were acquitted on several other counts ...
[We] urge the government to think carefully before instituting other massive prosecutions hav-
ing such slender foundations as this one.
Siegel, 717 F.2d at 22-23 (emphasis added). Despite the court's admonition, the U.S. Attorney's office
in the Southern District of New York argued-successfully-the precise terms of Siegel in Weiss.
56. See supra note 46. Arthur Liman, a prominent member of the New York bar, noted, "To the
businessman. . . prison is the inferno, and conventional risk-reward analysis breaks down when the
risk is jail." Liman, The Paper Label Sentences: Critiques, 86 YALE L.J. 619, 630-31 (1977). The
risk of jail for affluent white-collar defendants is not purely hypothetical. See Wheeler, Weisburd &
Bode, Sentencing the White-Collar Offender: Rhetoric and Reality, 47 Am. Soc. REv. 641, 658
(1982) (empirical study of white-collar sentencing revealed "a consistent and strong positive relation-
ship between socioeconomic status and the severity of the sentence, thus requiring modification of most
currently held views regarding that relationship.").
57. In addition, the current standard of liability under mail/wire fraud produces a dangerous
anomaly-a standard of criminal liability more expansive than the corresponding standard of civil
liability, notwithstanding the higher burden of proof required in criminal cases. In turn, private liti-
gants may be able to use the criminal standard to expand the civil standard, thus compounding the
problems caused by the criminal standard. On the use of criminal convictions to support civil dam-
ages, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 85 (1980).
Civil damages may also result under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982). In Weiss, three counts of mail fraud served as the predicate
felonies for a RICO count under which the defendant was forced to disgorge stock and warrants
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D. Fiduciary Rules and the Criminal Law
Fiduciary rules aim at approximating after the fact the standard of con-
duct for which the contracting parties would have bargained could they
have done so cheaply. The very reason for the existence of fiduciary
rules-the inability of the parties to spell out in advance precisely what
sort of conduct will be prohibited-suggests that these rules should not be
enforced with criminal sanctions. Even if courts are able to predict ex post
what the parties would have bargained for ex ante, it is difficult to justify
enforcing this judicially constructed implied contract with the criminal
law. The parties neither would nor could have contracted for criminal
sanctions as the enforcement provision of their contract. Hence, this use of
mail/wire fraud fails to approximate the will of the parties and is thus
bad contract law. It is bad criminal law as well. By definition, fiduciary
rules involve ex post judicial predictions of what the parties would have
required. The content of criminal laws, in contrast, should be knowable in
advance.8
III. THE PRACTICAL IMPACT OF EXPANSIVE MAIL/WIRE FRAUD
The problem of unwarranted prosecution of corporate executives is not
simply academic. Even a small number of convictions in this area signifi-
cantly and adversely affects the law of corporate fiduciary obligations and
hence the welfare of agents and principals. The overly expansive standard
of criminal liability arms federal prosecutors with the means to prosecute
and convict for a broad range of conduct without requiring them to sur-
mount specific evidentiary hurdles and prove the type of elements tradi-
tionally necessary for criminal convictions. When short-cut criminal stat-
utes exist, prosecutors use them.
Prosecutors make extensive use of mail/wire fraud for several reasons.
Mail/wire fraud charges can be effective prosecution bargaining chips in
the plea negotiation process.8 9 Given these statutes' flexibility, prosecutors
worth approximately $412,000. See Weiss, No. 84-1103, slip op. at 7095 (2d Cir. Jan. 7, 1985).
58. Liman bemoaned the proliferation of ex post facto criminal law:
It once was a first principle of our law that no one could be tried for a crime unless the
offense had been defined by the legislature in advance with sufficient clarity to warn the of-
fender of the consequences of his conduct. But today laws and regulations to which criminal
sanctions have been tacked are often so vague and complex that the verdict, ex post facto,
defines the crime.
Liman, supra note 56, at 634. See also Goldstein, supra note 9, at 463 (characterizing conspiracy to
defraud the United States as "a Kafkaesque crime, unknown and unknowable except in terms of the
facts of each case-and even then, not until the verdict has been handed down.").
59. See generally 13 LAW & Soc'y Rav. 189 (1979) (special issue on plea bargaining); Katz,
Legality and Equality: Plea Bargaining in the Prosecution of White-Collar and Common Crimes, 13
LAW & Soc'y REv. 431 (1979). In one study of white-collar crime, 82% of white-collar convictions
resulted from guilty pleas. Wheeler, Weisburd & Bode, supra note 56, at 643. For an excellent
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can add mail/wire fraud counts to a wide variety of indictments, aiming
to exchange dropped charges for guilty pleas and/or evidence to be used
against other defendants. This effect is largely invisible since no judicial
opinions result from plea deals. Therefore, it is hard to know, but perhaps
easy to speculate, just how strong a "stick" the threat of mail/wire fraud
prosecutions is to potential defendants. Given the experienced and expert
nature of the white-collar defense bar,60 it is likely that the mail/wire
fraud statutes are indeed effective bargaining tools."' Hence, many ill-
gotten plea deals probably result from threatened mail/wire fraud
prosecutions.
The white-collar crime investigatory process, described by a former
prosecutor as follows, also encourages prosecutors to rely on mail/wire
fraud:
Since the ultimate object of any investigation is indictment and either
plea or trial, federal prosecutors frequently will bring a case rela-
tively unrelated to whatever they originally were pursuing, simply
because it is an indictable, triable case. The federal agents who work
under the prosecutors also are anxious to turn investigations into ac-
tual prosecutions. They may press the prosecutor for indictment of
whatever offenses appear to be indictable, even if those offenses have
little relation to the initial investigation or involve lesser targets or
less serious conduct than originally anticipated. 2
Moreover, the open-ended elements of mail/wire fraud tempt prosecu-
discussion of the importance of the plea bargaining process in the white-collar crime context, see K.
MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A PoRTRArr oF ATTORNEYS AT WORK 19-24 (forth-
coming 1985) [hereinafter cited, in draft form, as K. MANN].
60. Mann explains that the white-collar defense bar centers around a small (but growing) circle
of New York attorneys, many of whom learned their trade as prosecutors:
The continued high priority given to white collar crime investigations and prosecutions in the
Southern District of New York and the high standard of practice maintained in that office
created a cadre of skilled young attorneys who could become defense practitioners after train-
ing in handling white collar cases from the prosecution side. Thus, not only has the prosecu-
tion policy of the district created a pool of clients, but also a pool of attorneys who could meet
the new demand for legal services in the private sector.
K. MANN, supra note 59, at 33. The fact that both Siegel and Weiss are Second Circuit cases takes on
added importance given both the focus of the white-collar criminal defense bar on and the concentra-
tion of financial activity in that circuit.
61. Mann explains: "Essential to defense planning is knowing whether the government will be
able to prove a crime against the client. . . ." Id. at 22. Given the open-ended standard of criminal
liability under mail/wire fraud and the consequent ease with which the prosecution can win a convic-
tion, prudent defense counsel will opt to bargain early.
62. Hurson, supra note 4, at 433 (footnote omitted). The author continues:
By the time this process reaches the indictment stage, agents and prosecutors may find them-
selves with facts accumulated through the course of their investigation that amount to some
sort of improper or dishonest activity but do not fit the traditional criteria for a federal of-
fense. . . . Quite often mail fraud is the only federal criminal charge available to bring
against a private individual or a nonfederal public official involved in corrupt activity.
Id. at 433-34 (footnote omitted).
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tors to charge mail/wire fraud in lieu of the more difficult (and more
costly) to prove offense actually involved.63 Finally, prosecutors add mail/
wire fraud counts as insurance when the primary charges rest on unsure
evidentiary footing." If the primary counts are weakened during the
course of the trial, the prosecutor can fall back on easy-to-prove mail/wire
fraud as a face-saving device.65
IV. FEDERALISM AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BENEFICIAL
CORPORATE LAW
The recent trend in mail/wire fraud cases suggests that federal prose-
cutors may soon lead the federal government into policing the internal
affairs of corporations by nationalizing (and criminalizing) the law of cor-
porate fiduciary obligations. This development is flatly inconsistent with
both Congress' refusal to nationalize corporate law by means of national
chartering of corporations and the federal courts' refusal to do so through
interpretation of the federal securities laws. Despite this clear legislative
and judicial preference in the corporate and securities law context, federal
prosecutors threaten to work an "end-run" of a beneficial system of state
corporate law by means of mail/wire fraud.
A. The Value of the Traditional FederallState Split in Corporate
Regulation
Congress has entrusted substantive regulation of intra-corporate affairs
to the states.66 Federal corporate law has traditionally been limited to a
mandatory disclosure system governing the sale and exchange of securi-
ties.67 One value of federalism-that the states may serve as laboratories
63. For this reason, mail/wire fraud opinions often read as if they involved violations of other
provisions. See supra note 27. Prosecutors hoping to establish criminal liability "on the cheap" may
be frustrated even when employing the mail/wire fraud statutes. See Siegel, 717 F.2d at 25 (Winter,
J., dissenting) (unfavorably comparing benefits of wire fraud prosecutions to costs of lengthy trial).
64. See Hurson, supra note 4, at 435 ("[Ilt has become standard practice for federal prosecutors
to tack on mail fraud charges as 'insurance' counts, even when the facts of a case call for application
of a different federal criminal statute." (citation omitted)).
65. Siegel reads as if it were a bribery or theft case, but apparently neither of these offenses could
be proven. See supra note 27.
66. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975).
67. The Supreme Court has characterized the purpose of the federal securities laws as substitut-
ing "a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor." SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). The question of whether the SEC disclosure regime
benefits shareholders is controversial. See S. PHILLIPS & J. ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST (1981) (concluding that SEC disclosure regime does not benefit investors); H. KRIPIE,
THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE (1979) (same);
Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REv. 132 (1973) (same); Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory
Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1 (1983) (concluding that SEC regime benefits investors);
Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 40 (expressing a middle view).
1442
Vol. 94: 1427, 1985
Mail and Wire Fraud
for change in the law 8-is especially prevalent in corporate law, where
states traditionally have competed for corporate charters."9 To attract cor-
porations, states must provide laws which minimize the cost of capital to
firms by providing beneficial legal rules. The development of a standard
of fiduciary liability which lowers firms' cost of capital" ° is a key factor in
this interstate competition. States that adopt fiduciary standards which
closely approximate the standard for which shareholders would bargain
will be rewarded with additional chartering fees.7 1 Federal law, unlike
state law, is not subject to a market discipline since corporations wishing
to continue doing business in the United States cannot opt out of the juris-
diction.7 2 Hence, the very fact that mail/wire fraud law is federal law
and, as such, not self-correcting in the way that state corporate law is
suggests that mail/wire fraud law is an inappropriate tool for regulating
the behavior of corporate fiduciaries.
B. Congressional and Judicial Approval of Interstate Competition in
Corporate Law
Both Congress and the Supreme Court have made clear their unwill-
ingness to nationalize corporate law. Proposals to institute national char-
68. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J. dissenting) ("It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country."). For a discussion of the current implications of Brandeis' view, see Steiner, A Progres-
sive Creed: The Experimental Federalism of Justice Brandeis, 2 YALE L. & PoL'Y RaV. 1 (1983).
69. The original exposition of this view is Winter, supra note 30, which examined "the rather
venerable proposals calling for the federal regulation of the governance of corporations against an
economic theory of corporate function and control," id. at 251 (footnote omitted) and concluded that
"(1) Contrary to the conventional wisdom, competitive legal systems should tend toward optimality so
far as the shareholder's relationship to the corporation is concerned. (2) State corporation codes in fact
seem quite consistent (optimality, of course, is not provable) with what economic theory suggests are
optimal legal arrangements." Id. at 254.
For a recent discussion of this issue, see R. Romano, Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle (Nov.
1984) (draft manuscript, forthcoming in 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. (1985)).
70. "Corporations must attract capital from a vast range of competing opportunities and the state
which 'rigs' its code to benefit management will drive debt and equity capital away." Winter, supra
note 30, at 289.
71. "The relation between state revenues and responsiveness is one feature that serves to bind a
state to act cooperatively with firms by continuing to revise its code and thereby adequately service its
corporate clientele." R. Romano, supra note 69, at 88. See also Winter, supra note 30, at 258-62.
This theory has been supported by empirical studies. See R. Romano, supra note 69, at 90 (con-
cluding that "a centralized system could impose a welfare loss on firms"); Dodd & Leftwich, The
Market for Corporate Charters: "Unhealthy Competition" versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. Bus.
259, 282 (1980) ("Our study reveals that the case for federal chartering is not supported by the
evidence. The evidence is consistent with our hypothesis that managers of a firm take advantage of the
competition among states to locate in a state which offers an efficient set of restrictions on the firm
72. "[G]iven the size of the federal budget, there is no revenue incentive to constrain the national
government from acting opportunistically by installing high franchise fees without delivering value-
maximizing laws, and there are no options for firms (except to become unincorporated) in retaliation
against such behavior." R. Romano, supra note 69, at 90.
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tering of corporations were advanced and debated in the mid-1970's. 3
Recognizing the virtue of the competition among states in corporate law,
Congress rejected these proposals. Opponents of national chartering relied
on the federalism argument during debate.7 4
The federal courts have also rejected efforts to nationalize corporate
law. In Santa Fe Industries v. Green," the Supreme Court explicitly
rejected the contention that section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act7 6
or SEC Rule 10b-5," federal provisions which regulate insider trading,
also created a general federal law of fiduciary duties, stating: "Absent a
clear indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant to federalize the
substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions
in securities, particularly where established state policies of corporate reg-
ulation would be overridden." '78
In litigation involving management defense against hostile tender of-
fers,7" federal courts have also rejected attempts to expand the scope of
federal corporate law. Claiming that they are injured when management
employs certain defensive tactics to oppose tender offers, shareholders have
challenged management's use of these tactics8 under section 14(e) of the
Securities Exchange Act,"' which prohibits fraud and manipulation in the
tender offer process. The majority of federal courts which have heard such
claims have, however, refused to read section 14(e), a federal disclosure
73. Proposals for national chartering are found in R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, CON-
STITUTIONALIZING THE CORPORATION: THE CASE FOR THE FEDERAL CHARTERING OF GIANT
CORPORATIONS (1976); Cary, supra note 40.
74. See Corporate Rights and Responsibilities, 1976: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). Compare statements of Charles Crompton, Jr., partner, Pot-
ter, Anderson & Corroon, Wilmington, Del.; Henry G. Manne, Prof., Univ of Miami School of Law;
John W. Riehm, Chamber of Commerce of the United States; and Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Prof., Yale
University (defending system of state regulation) with statements of Ralph Nader, Mark J. Green, &
Joel Seligman, Corporate Accountability Research Group; Donald Schwartz, Prof., Georgetown
Univ. Law Center (advocating federal chartering).
75. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982) prohibits manipulation or deception in connection with the purchase
or sale of securities.
77. 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1982) prohibits fraud, false statements, and material omissions in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of securities.
78. 430 U.S. at 479. The Court recalled its ruling in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975) ("Cor-
porations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the
understanding that, except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors
with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation.").
79. For a discussion of the tender offer process, see Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a
Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1161 (1981).
80. See Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 1326 (1984); Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 550 (1983); Billard v. Rockwell Intern. Corp., 683 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1982); Panter v. Marshall
Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981) (cases rejecting § 14(e)
claims in light of Santa Fe). But see Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981)
(allowing § 14 (e) challenge to defensive tactics in hostile tender offer).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (e) (1982).
1444
Mail and Wire Fraud
provision, as imposing a duty of passivity on target managers."2 Some of
these tactics may indeed constitute breaches of an appropriate duty of care
or loyalty. Because they are fully disclosed, however, and therefore not
fraudulent or manipulative, they do not fall within the ambit of section
14(e)."3 By maintaining the separation of tasks between state and federal
law, the courts facilitate state law experimentation with solutions to com-
plex legal and economic problems.8" Ultimately, the "market for law,"
wherein states compete for corporations' loyalties and charter fees, should
create incentives for states to allow the optimal level of defense by target
managers. 85
82. See cases cited supra note 80. Even Judge Winter of the Second Circuit, despite his recogni-
tion of the importance of the integrity of the tender offer market, see Winter, supra note 30, at
270-73, 287-89, concluded in a § 14(e) case that, "The gravamen of the claim advanced here is a
breach of management's fiduciary duty to shareholders, a matter traditionally committed to state law,
which, if entertained, would unquestionably embark us on a course leading to a federal common law
of fiduciary obligations." Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1326 (1984).
The lone dissenting circuit is the Sixth. See Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th
Cir. 1981). That case arose out of an acquisition contest for Marathon. Mobil sued to enjoin the
exercise of "lock-up" options granted by Marathon to its favored potential acquirer, claiming that
these options were manipulative and, therefore, violated § 14(e). The Sixth Circuit, reversing the
district court, ruled in favor of Mobil's request for a preliminary injunction. The decision reflected the
court's disapproval of this defensive tactic, but may have had little impact on the parties involved in
the bidding contest because an antitrust action had effectively precluded Mobil from acquiring Mara-
thon. See Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 669 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982
(1982). Cf. G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 34-35 (1982) (Justice
Frankfurter's harsh construction of FELA and Jones Act in dissents amounted to "judicial blackmail"
and was aimed at the legislature and not at substance of cases involved).
On the implications of corporate takeovers on shareholder welfare, see Bebchuk, The Case for
Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L. REv. 23 (1982); Easter-
brook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1982); Gilson,
Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. Rav. 51
(1982).
83. See Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp, 717 F.2d 757, 760 (2d Cir.) ("An essential ingredient
of a section 14(e) cause of action . . . is misrepresentation, i.e., the omission or misstatement of
material facts.") (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 550 (1983).
84. The Seventh Circuit actually heard and rejected state fiduciary law claims in Panter v. Mar-
shall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293-99 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). The plain-
tiff's quite plausible state law claims would perhaps succeed under the laws of a state seeking to
attract corporate charters.
85. Optimality in this context is difficult to establish. Target management's ability to defend
against a hostile acquisition can be viewed as a form of compensation. If all defensive tactics were
illegal (assuming that one could even identify all conduct aimed at resisting a hostile offer), managers
would demand additional compensation for their services to public companies. Golden parachutes
provide a useful analogy. When fashioned before the advent of a hostile acquisition attempt, they may
reflect an effort to compensate managers for their risk of being dislodged. See Note, Golden
Parachutes and the Business Judgment Rule: Toward a Proper Standard of Review, 94 YALE L.J.
909 (1985). Defensive tactics generally, however, are extremely costly to shareholders. See R. GILSON,
LEGAL AND FINANCIAL MATERIALS ON CORPORATE AcQuisrToNs ch. 14 (forthcoming 1985) (cited
in draft form).
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CONCLUSION
Mail/wire fraud convictions premised on a corporate executive's breach
of fiduciary duty do not protect and may in fact injure shareholders. Such
convictions have created ill-defined federal duties; duties which are better
defined at the state level. These convictions can be defended on share-
holder protection grounds only by ignoring the cost side of the analysis.
The cases establish legal standards that prosecutors can exploit in procur-
ing unwarranted convictions and guilty pleas.
The effective elimination of the element of fraud from mail/wire
fraud8" suggests that the purpose of these cases may not have been the
protection of "defrauded victims." Although the case law speaks of breach
of fiduciary duty to shareholders,8 7 prosecutors and judges might defend
these cases as protecting society from corporate fiduciary misconduct.
However, since this "misconduct" need not amount to fraud, it is left to
judges and juries in future cases to spell out precisely what sort of conduct
constitutes mail/wire fraud. This use of the mail/wire fraud statutes
shifts responsibility for defining the limits of corporate fiduciary behavior
from the legislature to prosecutors, judges, and juries and, in so doing,
creates something akin to a common law crime"" offensive to accepted no-
tions of legality.
Peter R. Ezersky
86. See supra text accompanying notes 19-29.
87. See Weiss, 84-1103, slip op. (2d Cir. Jan. 7, 1985); Siegel, 717 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1983).
88. See J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 27-69 (2d ed. 1960).
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